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This paper considers the problem of testing an expert who makes probabilistic fore-
casts about the outcomes of a stochastic process. I show that, under general conditions
on the tester's prior, a likelihood test can distinguish informed from uninformed ex-
perts with high prior probability. The test rejects informed experts on data-generating
processes where the tester quickly learns the true probabilities by updating her prior.
However, the set of processes on which informed experts are rejected is topologically
small. These results contrast sharply with many negative results in the literature.
1 Introduction
In settings ranging from economics and politics to meteorology, ostensible experts oer
probabilistic forecasts of a sequence of events. Testing the reliability of these forecasts can
be problematic since probabilistic forecasts of individual events are not generally falsiable.
It is tempting to think that this problem should disappear with the collection of enough
data; that is, that an appropriately designed test could reliably distinguish true experts
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1from charlatans by comparing a long sequence of forecasts to the realized sequence of events.
However, recent work has shown that under very general conditions, no such test exists
(see Olszewski and Sandroni (2008) and Shmaya (2008)). Any test that passes experts who
know the true data-generating process can also be passed on any realized data by experts
who know nothing, but who choose their forecasts appropriately.
Negative results of this type usually require that an expert who knows the true data-
generating process be able to pass the test no matter what the true process is. In this
paper, I show that eective testing is generally possible if true experts are allowed to fail
with small probability relative to given prior beliefs over the data-generating process.
Consider a tester who believes that there is some true distribution P generating the
data, but who faces uncertainty about P captured by some distribution . The distinction
between the distributions  and P can be understood in terms of the standard distinction
between epistemic and aleatory uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty results from a lack of
knowledge of a physical process that could in principle be eliminated. Aleatory uncertainty
is inherent to the environment. In this terminology, the distribution P captures the aleatory
uncertainty whereas the prior distribution  captures the tester's epistemic uncertainty.
Two natural requirements arise for a tester who forms beliefs  over the data-generating
process. First, true experts should pass the test with high probability relative to these
beliefs. More precisely, if the data are generated by a distribution P, an expert forecasting
according to P should pass the test on a set of outcomes with large P-probability, except
perhaps for a set of distributions P having small -probability. Second, an expert who
does not know the true process|but does know the tester's prior|should not be able to
pass the test. That is, no matter what mixed forecasting strategy  a false expert uses, she
should fail the test with high (;P)-probability for a set of distributions P having large
-probability.
2Designing a test with both of these properties is not possible for every prior . For
instance, if  assigns probability 1=2 to each of two distributions P1 and P2, then a true
expert must pass with high probability on both distributions, in which case a false expert
can also pass with probability close to 1=2 simply by forecasting according to either one of
P1 or P2.
I show below that there exists a likelihood ratio test satisfying both desiderata whenever
forecasts derived from the tester's prior do not converge to the true probabilities quickly,
or do so only with small -probability. The test is based on a comparison of the likelihood
assigned to the realized data by the expert's forecasts to that assigned by the tester's
forecasts (obtained through Bayesian updating of  given the realized data to date). The
expert passes the test if two conditions are satised: (i) the likelihood associated with the
expert's forecasts is eventually higher than that associated with the tester's, and (ii) the
expert's forecasts do not converge to those of the tester too quickly.1 For a true expert,
condition (i) is almost surely satised whenever condition (ii) holds. Thus a true expert
fails the test only when the tester learns the true probabilities independently of the expert's
forecasts (in which case the tester may have no need for the expert). A false expert, on
the other hand, cannot manipulate this test. Regardless of the false expert's forecasting
strategy, she fails the test with probability 1 with respect to the tester's prior and her
own randomization. Intuitively, condition (ii) forces the false expert to make forecasts
that are very unlikely to outperform the tester's own when the data-generating process is
distributed according to the tester's beliefs.
One might worry that allowing true experts to fail with small probability with respect
to a xed prior nonetheless allows them to fail on a large set of distributions, and thus
fails to be robust to incorrect priors. It turns out that, regardless of the prior , the true
1More precisely, the sum of the squared dierences between the two forecasts diverges.
3expert fails the likelihood ratio test with positive probability only on a topologically small
set of distributions (in the sense of Baire category). Therefore, the test also has desirable
properties from the perspective of a non-Bayesian tester who wants to avoid manipulation
by false experts without failing true experts on a large set of distributions. Such a tester
can use the test corresponding to a prior  chosen so that, under this prior, the tester does
not learn the true probabilities too quickly. The set of distributions on which true experts
fail the test is then small in both a topological and a measure-theoretic sense.
2 Related literature
Previous literature has identied an important distinction for tests that are required to pass
true experts on every data-generating process. Dekel and Feinberg (2006) and Olszewski
and Sandroni (2009a) have obtained strong positive results if the tester can ask the expert
to report the entire distribution P over innite sequences of data. In many real-world
settings, however, the tester can observe only the single-period forecasts made by the
expert along the realized data sequence. In this case, Olszewski and Sandroni (2008) and
Shmaya (2008) have shown that every test that passes true experts can be manipulated by
false experts.2 Thus any non-manipulable test that passes true experts necessarily violates
the prequential principle (Dawid (1984)), which states that tests of forecasts should be
based only on the forecast probabilities along the realized path of data, not on forecasts
following hypothetical events that did not occur. In this paper, I restrict attention to this
sequential setting to highlight the contrast with these negative results.
Olszewski and Sandroni (2009b) were the rst to consider tests that fail true experts
on some distributions, referring to the set on which they pass as a paradigm. They prove
2These results represent the culmination of a line of research considering various classes of tests, be-
ginning with Foster and Vohra (1998). See also Lehrer (2001), Olszewski and Sandroni (2009b), Sandroni
(2003), Sandroni et al. (2003), and Vovk and Shafer (2005).
4negative results when the paradigm is closed and convex, and identify a nonmanipulable
test that fails true experts only if the single-period probabilities are close to 50% too often.
Al-Najjar, Sandroni, Smorodinsky, and Weinstein (2008) propose an alternative paradigm
in which eective testing is possible. Fortnow and Vohra (2009) take a dierent approach,
obtaining positive results by restricting the class of strategies available to the false expert.
The likelihood test proposed here bears a close resemblance to the comparative test
suggested by Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2008). When the expert is uninformed, the tester's
forecasts play a role akin to the informed expert's forecasts in their setting. However, there
is an essential dierence. In our setting, the uninformed expert knows the tester's prior,
and hence can predict the tester's forecasts, but is prevented from following these forecasts
by the denition of the test. In Al-Najjar and Weinstein's setting, the uninformed expert
fails to manipulate the test because she is unable to predict the forecasts that the informed
expert will make and can only pass by making forecasts close to those of the informed
expert. Section 6 below elaborates on the relationship between the present setting and
tests of multiple experts.
Like the present paper, Olszewski and Sandroni (2009b) also consider the probability
of manipulation with respect to some prior measure, but in their case the prior is dened
directly over the set of realizations. Proposition 3 of their paper shows that a false expert
can pass on a set of realizations having large measure with respect to any xed prior as long
as the test does not reject correct forecasts based on the data-generating process. Thus
it is crucial that our test does not pass true experts on every data-generating process.
Otherwise, taking the reduction of the tester's prior  to be the measure in Olszewski and
Sandroni's result would show that the false expert can manipulate with high -probability.
53 The test
An outcome is realized in each period t = 1;2;:::. For simplicity, the set of possible
outcomes in each period is taken to be f0;1g. Let 
 = f0;1g
N denote the set of realizations
endowed with the product topology, where N = f1;2;:::g. We denote by ! = (!t)1
t=1 a
generic element of 
. The realization ! is generated according to a probability distribution
P 2 (
), where (X) denotes the set of probability distributions dened on the Borel
subsets of a set X. The tester forms a prior belief about the distribution P according to
some  2 (
), where (
) is endowed with the weak* topology. Given any Q 2 (
)
and any nite history !t = (!1;:::;!t) 2 f0;1g




f0;1g for the probability distribution over !t+1 conditional on !t having occurred.
In each period t = 1;2;:::, the expert reports a forecast (or prediction) pt+1 2 f0;1g,
interpreted as the probability distribution over !t+1 given the realized outcome so far.
Before reporting pt+1, the expert perfectly observes the history !t = (!1;:::;!t) of realized
outcomes to date. The tester also observes each realized outcome !t.
There are two kinds of expert: true (or informed) and false (or uninformed). True ex-
perts observe the distribution P before choosing their forecasts and simply report the true
one-step-ahead probabilities given the history of realized outcomes to date. That is, fol-
lowing each nite history of realizations !t, true experts report the forecast pt+1 = P(!t).3
False experts know only the tester's prior  and may choose their forecasts according to
any mixed strategy. Fixing , a (behavioral) strategy for the false expert is therefore a
collection  = ftg1
t=1 of functions
t : Ht 1  ! f0;1g;
3Note that, in order to employ this strategy, true experts need not know the full distribution P. It is
enough for them to know only the one-step-ahead conditional probabilities along the realized outcome path.
6where Ht 1 = f0;1gt 1(f0;1g)t 1 is the set of histories (!t 1;(p1;:::;pt 1)) of realized
outcomes and forecasts up to period t   1. Thus the false expert's forecast in each period
may depend on both the realized outcomes to date and the realizations of her own previous
randomized choices of forecasts.
Note that, by the Kolmogorov Extension Theorem, distributions P 2 (
) are in
direct correspondence (up to sets of measure zero) with complete families of one-step-
ahead forecasts P(!t) 2 (f0;1g), one for each nite history !t of outcomes. Thus a
distribution P 2 (
) corresponds to a pure forecasting strategy for a false expert.
The present paper focuses on a likelihood ratio test that, given the tester's prior ,
passes or fails the expert depending only on the realized outcome ! 2 
 and the sequence
(p1;p2;:::) of forecasts reported by the expert. The test compares the likelihood the
expert's predictions assign to the realized data to that of the tester's predictions (given
by expectations based on the tester's posterior beliefs in each period). The expert passes
the test only if her predictions assign a higher likelihood to the data and are suciently
dierent from the tester's forecasts. Formally, given , dene the mean distribution P =
R
(
) Pd(P). The test score following any nite history ht 2 Ht of outcomes and expert





where ps(!s) denotes the probability that the expert's forecast assigned to the realized
outcome in period s and ps(!s) = P(!s 1)(!s) denotes the one-step-ahead conditional
probability assigned to the realized outcome !s by the mean distribution conditional on
the realized history !s 1 to date. Note that the event that pt (!t) = 0 for some t occurs
with -probability 0; in that case, the expert passes the test. Otherwise, the expert passes
the test if
1. liminft!1 S(ht) > 1, and
72.
P
t(pt(1)   pt(1))2 diverges.
This test fails true experts if the tester's forecasts converge to the correct probabilities
suciently quickly. If the tester uses the forecasts to choose an actions in some decision
problem in each period, then when this convergence occurs, the additional value of the
expert's forecasts becomes small even when they are correct, so failing to pass a true
expert causes little harm to the tester (see Echenique and Shmaya (2008), who show that,
as a tester becomes patient, using an incorrect theory is harmful only if the likelihood ratio
is unbounded).
If the test was based only on the likelihood ratio without the additional condition
that forecasts dier from those of the tester, then the test could be easily manipulated
with positive probability simply by choosing forecasts dierent from the tester's until the
likelihood ratio exceeds 1, then choosing forecasts identical to the tester's forever after.
Some such strategy succeeds with positive probability as long as the tester does not assign
probability 1 to some Dirac measure.
It is worth noting that, while the test has properties that are desirable from the per-
spective of a Bayesian tester, the test itself is not Bayesian insofar as it is does not depend
on the tester's belief about the expert's knowledge. An alternative approach would be for
the tester simply to update the probability that the expert knows the true distribution
based on the forecasts and the realized data. In order to do so, however, the tester would
have to form beliefs about the false expert's forecasting strategy. Instead, the likelihood
ratio test proposed here is independent of these beliefs and exhibits the desired properties
for every strategy a false expert might use (and hence with respect to any beliefs the tester
might form about the false expert's strategy).
83.1 The tester's decision problem
The typical requirement in the literature that true experts must pass with high probability
for every true distribution is very strong and dicult to justify in terms of the tester's
decision problem. For natural payos, this requirement arises only if the tester has an
extreme form of ambiguity aversion. To see this, consider a tester whose preferences are
represented by the maxmin expected utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). For simplic-
ity, suppose that the tester's belief about the type of the expert is constant and assigns
positive probability to each of the two types. The tester forms a set S of priors over the set
(
) of possible true distributions. Suppose moreover that the tester receives a positive
payo for passing a true expert, a positive payo for failing a false expert, and a payo of
0 for failing a true expert or passing a false expert.
Consider a test T with no type I error that requires the expert to report a full distri-
bution P 2 (
) (as opposed to a sequence of one-step-ahead forecasts). For any xed
distribution Q, let TQ be the test that delivers the same verdict as T whenever the expert
forecasts a distribution other than Q but fails the expert if she forecasts Q (regardless of
the realized data). In order for the tester to strictly prefer T to TQ, Q must be an atom of
some prior in S. The requirement that there be no type I error therefore corresponds to
this setting if for every Q 2 (
), there exists some prior in S having Q as an atom. This
property assumes that the tester has a strong form of ambiguity aversion.
In this paper, I (implicitly) consider a tester who is a classical expected utility maxi-
mizer. As above, the tester's payo depends only on the type of the expert and whether the
expert passes or fails the test. I assume that the tester prefers to pass the true expert and
fail the false expert. The tester has a prior belief over the set of possible distributions and
a xed prior belief over the type of the expert that is independent of the true distribution.
In this setting, the tester's goal is to pass true experts and fail false experts, both with
9high probability with respect to her prior.
4 Properties of the test
A Bayesian tester with prior  should desire the following properties of a test:
1. A true expert should pass the test with high P-probability for a set of distributions
P having large -probability.
2. No matter what strategy  she uses, a false expert should fail the test with high
(P;)-probability for a set of distributions P having large -probability.
As noted above, for some priors  it is not possible to satisfy both of these criteria si-
multaneously. The following result indicates that these properties can be satised under
a general condition on , namely that the -probability that the tester learns the true
probabilities suciently quickly is small. Under this condition, the second property holds
in a strong form: the false expert almost surely fails to manipulate the test.
Let " = Pr
P
t (pt(1)   pt(1))
2 converges

, where pt denotes the true probability
density in period t. The following proposition shows that, when " is small, the likelihood
ratio test from Section 3 satises both of the above desiderata.4
Proposition 1. For the likelihood ratio test described above, (i) a true expert passes the
test with -probability 1   ", and (ii) for any forecasting strategy , the false expert passes
the test with (;)-probability 0.
Proof. The proof begins by extending one direction of Kakutani's Theorem for Product
Martingales (see, e.g., Williams (1991)) to allow for dependence among the factors. First
4For many priors we have " = 0, in which case Proposition 1 implies that the test almost surely gives
a correct verdict on whether or not the expert is informed. Section 5 provides a natural example in which
" = 0 even though the tester learns the true probabilities in the limit as t ! 1.
10consider the case of a false expert using a pure forecasting strategy. Given any sequence
of forecasts qt, the single-period ratio Yt = qt (!t)=pt (!t) satises E (YtjY1;:::;Yt 1) = 1
for all t. The product Xt =
Q
kt Yk is a non-negative martingale that is bounded in L1.
By the martingale convergence theorem, (Xt)1
t=1 converges almost surely to some random
variable X1.












Then Zt is a nonnegative martingale. Moreover, by inductively applying the law of iterated
expectations, one sees that E(Zt) = 1 for all t. In particular, (Zt)1
t=1 is bounded in L1,
and hence converges almost surely to some Z1 by the martingale convergence theorem. It
follows that if
Q




Yt = 0 almost surely, and hence
Q
t Yt = 0




It remains to show that
Q
t at(Y1;:::;Yt 1) = 0 whenever
P
t (qt(1)   pt(1))
2 diverges.
Note that
















(1   pt(1))(1   qt(1)):
Letting t = qt(1)   pt(1), we have
at (Y1;:::;Yt 1) =
p
pt(1)2 + tpt(1) +
q
(1   pt(1))
2   t(1   pt(1)):
11For xed , the function
f(p) =
p
p2 + p +
p
(1   p)2   (1   p)
is maximized when p = 1 
2 , with maximum value
p
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We have shown that for any pure forecasting strategy, a false expert -almost surely fails
the test whenever
P
t (qt(1)   pt(1))
2 diverges. Since the test always fails the expert if this
sum converges, it follows that the expert almost surely fails the test for any pure forecasting
strategy. Therefore, the expert also fails almost surely with any mixed forecasting strategy.
The same argument with the roles of the numerator and denominator reversed shows
that, conditional on
P
t (pt(1)   pt(1))
2 diverging, a true expert passes the test P-almost
surely.
Proposition 1 shows that there exists a test that eectively distinguishes between true
and false experts as long as " is small. Moreover, the test perfectly satises the desired
criteria when " = 0. In order for " to be positive, the tester must possess considerable
knowledge of the data-generating process: not only must the tester's forecasts approach
12the true probabilities (with positive probability), they must do so quickly. Indeed, the
condition that
P
t (pt(1)   pt(1))
2 converges implies that t1=2 jpt(1)   pt(1)j vanishes as
t ! 1 on some density one sequence,5 which is the usual standard for fast convergence of
forecasts (see, e.g., Sandroni and Smorodinsky (1999)).
As an alternative to the decision problem described in Section 3.1, in which the tester
simply wants to know whether or not the expert is informed, Echenique and Shmaya (2008)
and Olszewski and P, eski (2008) consider a tester who is directly interested in predicting
outcomes in each period. In their settings, in each period t, the tester chooses an action at
before observing the realized outcome !t and receives a 
ow payo depending on the pair
(at;!t). Accurate forecasts may help the tester to choose actions generating higher payos.
One can show that if
P
t (pt(1)   pt(1))
2 converges, then the payo loss to the tester from
following her own predictions instead of those of a true expert vanish as the tester becomes
very patient. Proposition 1 thus oers a counterpoint to the \you won't harm me if you
fool me" result of Echenique and Shmaya (2008), which shows the existence of a test that
passes true experts and creates little loss for a patient tester if a false expert passes. Here
true experts may fail, but again there is little loss for the tester.
The tester's prior imposes more structure on the testing problem than is the norm in
the literature. In particular, every prior assigns probability 1 to some topologically small
set (in the sense of Baire category). One might worry, then, that the test rejects true
experts on many distributions. However, this is not the case; the set of distributions on
which true experts fail the test is topologically small. In order to prove this, we begin
with a general result on merging of opinions. This result may be of independent interest
in light of the central role played by merging in the literature on learning and reputation
in repeated games (see, e.g., Kalai and Lehrer (1993) and Sorin (1999)).
5The density of an increasing sequence (tk)
1
k=1 with tk 2 N is dened to be limsupk!1 k=tk.
13Given distributions P;Q 2 (
), we say that Q weakly merges with P at ! if for every
 > 0 there exists some T such that
jpt(1)   qt(1)j <  for all t > T;
where pt and qt denote the one-step-ahead distributions along ! associated with P and Q
respectively. The distribution Q is said to weakly merge with P with probability  if
P (f! j Q weakly merges with P at !g) = :
Most work on merging has focused on global concepts that require merging to occur with
probability one.6 The notion of weak merging introduced by Kalai and Lehrer (1994)
corresponds to almost sure weak merging in our terminology.
Proposition 2. For any distribution Q 2 (
), the set of distributions P such that Q
weakly merges with P with positive probability is category I.
Proof. The proof follows an approach similar to that of Feinberg and Stewart (2008),
Proposition 2. Choose any  2 (0;1=4). For each nite history h and " 2 (0;1), let
S(h;")  (
) be the set of distributions P such that P(h)  " and
PrP (jpt(1)   qt(1)j <  for all t   j h)  "; (1)
where  is the length of h and pt and qt denote one-step-ahead distributions as above. The







6Lehrer and Smorodinsky (2000) is an exception. They study a weaker notion of pointwise merging.
14so it suces to show that each S(h;") is nowhere dense.
First we will prove that S(h;") is closed by showing that its complement is open. Con-
sider P = 2 S(h;"). Either P(h) < " or (1) fails. If P(h) < ", then the set fP0 j P0(h) < "g
contains P, is open in (
), and is disjoint from S(h;"). If (1) fails, then there exists
some T >  such that
PrP (jpt(1)   qt(1)j <  for all t = ;:::;T j h) = "0 < ":
The set

P0 j jP0(E)   P(E)j < "   "0 for all events E determined by time T
	
contains P, is open, and is disjoint from S(h;").
All that remains is to show that S(h;") has empty interior. Again let  denote the length
of h. Fixing P 2 S(h;"), we want to construct a sequence of distributions Pn = 2 S(h;")
converging to P. Choosing Pn so that the one-step-ahead forecasts agree with P in every
period t   + n and dier from P by at least 2 following every history of length  + n
does the job.
Corollary 1. The set of distributions P 2 (
) for which a true expert fails the test with
positive P-probability is category I.
Proof. Suppose that a true expert fails with positive P-probability when the distribution is
P. Then the sum
P
t (pt(1)   pt(1))
2 converges with positive P-probability. In particular,
for any  > 0, there exists some nite history h of length  such that P(h) > 0 and, with
positive probability, jpt(1)   pt(1)j <  for all t  . Therefore, P weakly merges with P
with positive probability.
15Proposition 2 improves upon the innite horizon analogue of the test studied by Ol-
szewski and Sandroni (2009b) that rejects experts who forecast close to 50% too often.
Their test cannot be manipulated but rejects true experts on a set of distributions that is
topologically small in a weaker sense than category I. One might think that forecasts close
to 50% are relatively uninformative, and hence rejecting experts who make such forecasts
is reasonable. Relative to a given prior, however, a forecast close to 50% can be very
informative. The above test accounts for this feature by only failing true experts if their
forecasts are uninformative relative to the tester's prior.
5 Example
The following example illustrates the power of the test even when the tester learns the true
probabilities (but not too quickly). Suppose that the tester's prior  can be parameterized
by a uniform distribution over  2 [0;1], and for each  the true process is i.i.d. with
probability  in each period. In this case, one can easily devise non-manipulable tests that
pass true experts with -probability 1. One example is the test that passes the expert if and
only if the empirical frequency converges to her rst-period forecast p1. However, this test
is not robust to incorrect priors in the sense of Proposition 2; true experts almost surely fail
the test on a large set of distributions. The likelihood ratio test proposed above is robust
in this sense and passes true experts with -probability equal to the probability with which
the sum
P
t (pt   )
2 diverges. Even though the tester almost surely asymptotically learns
the true probabilities in this setting (see, e.g., Doob (1949)), it turns out that this learning
occurs suciently slowly for the test to be eective. The following claim, together with
Proposition 1, shows that the test passes true experts with P-probability 1 for -almost
every P, and false experts with probability 0.
Claim. For each  2 (0;1), the sum
P
t (pt   )
2 diverges with probability 1.
16Proof. Following any nite history !t = (!1;:::;!t), let nt =
Pt
s=1 !t. It is straightforward
to show that pt+1(!t) = nt+1

















Dene the density of a sequence (xt) 2 f0;1gN to be limsupT
PT
t=1 xt
T . For " > 0, dene


































diverges whenever the sequence (x"
t)t has positive density. Thus it suces to show that, as
" vanishes, the probability that the sequence (x"
t)t has positive density tends to 1.
Let E"
t denote the event that x"















since the left-hand side is the probability that E"
t occurs at least k times up to time T, and
whenever E"
t occurs k times, the right-hand side counts (upper bounds on) the associated
probabilities at least k times. Note that, by the Central Limit Theorem, given  > 0, there
exist T0 large enough and " > 0 small enough so that Pr(E"
t) < =2 for all t > T0. Thus in




















t  (1   )T
!
  (2)
as T tends to 1.
I claim that (2) implies that (x"
t)t has density at least 1    with probability at least
1   . Since the choice of  was arbitrary, this claim completes the proof. To prove the
claim, suppose that it does not hold. Then there exists a set of sequences (x"
t)t with
probability greater than  each with density less than 1   . Hence there must exist some
T00 such that for a subset of these sequences (x"
t)t of measure greater than , the frequency
of ones in (x"
t)t up to time T is less than 1    for all T > T00, violating (2).
6 Discussion
The test studied here may be thought of as a test of two experts in which one of the experts
forecasts according to the tester's prior . The test adds to a simple likelihood ratio test
a condition that the expert passes only if her forecasts are suciently dierent from the
tester's. More generally, one could consider modifying any test of two experts so as to make
the experts fail if their forecasts converge suciently quickly. The positive results above
rely on the property of the original likelihood ratio test (without this modication) that a
Bayesian who reports truthfully expects to pass the test against any xed strategy of the
other forecaster|in other words, against any false expert|unless the forecasts of the two
18experts converge suciently quickly. In our setting, once the closeness condition is added,
this property ensures that a true expert passes unless the tester's forecasts converge quickly
to the true probabilities. This property also ensures that, for distributions generated by
the tester's prior, a false expert cannot outperform the tester in terms of the likelihood
ratio unless her forecasts converge quickly to those of the tester, in which case she fails the
modied test.
Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2008) and Feinberg and Stewart (2008) propose multiple
expert tests that cannot be manipulated. Both tests derive their power from properties
similar to those described above. More precisely, true experts pass both tests, and in the
presence of a true expert, a false expert can pass only if her forecasts are eventually close
to those of the true expert. By modifying these tests to reject experts whose forecasts
become close, and treating the tester as one of the two forecasters, positive results similar
to Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 above could be obtained beginning from either test,
although the precise closeness condition that must be added may dier.
It may seem counterintuitive that the proposed test encounters problems when the
tester learns the truth. After all, a tester who knows the true probabilities can very easily
check the validity of the expert's forecasts. The reason is that in this case the false expert
also learns the truth since she knows the tester's prior. If the false expert makes forecasts
that converge rapidly to the tester's forecasts then the data cannot reliably distinguish
which of the two is closer to the truth.
To gain a partial intuition for the contrast between the positive results presented
here and the negative results in the literature, consider the problem of designing a non-
manipulable test with no type I error. The negative results can be understood by reformu-
lating this testing problem as a zero-sum game between a forecaster who wants to choose
forecasts to pass a given test and malevolent Nature who wants to choose the realization to
19make the forecaster fail. If the Minmax Theorem holds in this setting, then the worst-case
expected payos for true and false experts must be equal. It follows that if a true expert
passes almost surely for any distribution chosen by Nature, then a false expert must also
pass almost surely. For the above likelihood ratio test, given any prior for the tester, true
experts fail on some distributions. This feature makes the worst-case payo for a true
expert equal to that of failure, which suces to prevent manipulation by a false expert
even if the set of distributions on which a true expert fails has small prior probability.
References
Al-Najjar, N., A. Sandroni, R. Smorodinsky, and J. Weinstein (2008). Testing theories
with learnable and predictive representations. Mimeo.
Al-Najjar, N. and J. Weinstein (2008). Comparative testing of experts. Econometrica 76,
541{559.
Dawid, P. (1984). Statistical theory: The prequential approach. Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, Series A 147, 278{292.
Dekel, E. and Y. Feinberg (2006). Non-bayesian testing of a stochastic prediction. Review
of Economic Studies 73, 893{906.
Doob, J. (1949). Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scien-
tique, Chapter Application of the theory of martingales, pp. 23{27.
Echenique, F. and E. Shmaya (2008). You won't harm me if you fool me. Mimeo.
Feinberg, Y. and C. Stewart (2008). Testing multiple forecasters. Econometrica 76, 561{
582.
Fortnow, L. and R. Vohra (2009). The complexity of testing forecasts. Econometrica 77,
93{105.
20Foster, D. and R. Vohra (1998). Asymptotic calibration. Biometrika 85, 379{390.
Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler (1989). Maxmin expected utility with a non-unique prior.
Journal of Mathematical Economics 18, 141{153.
Kalai, E. and E. Lehrer (1993). Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Economet-
rica 61, 1019{1045.
Kalai, E. and E. Lehrer (1994). Weak and strong merging of opinions. Journal of Math-
ematical Economics 23, 73{86.
Lehrer, E. (2001). Any inspection is manipulable. Econometrica 69, 1333{1347.
Lehrer, E. and R. Smorodinsky (2000). Relative entropy in sequential decision problems.
Journal of Mathematical Economics 33, 425{439.
Olszewski, W. and M. P, eski (2008). The principal-agent approach to testing experts.
Mimeo.
Olszewski, W. and A. Sandroni (2008). Manipulability of future-independent tests.
Econometrica 76, 1437{1466.
Olszewski, W. and A. Sandroni (2009a). A nonmanipulable test.
Olszewski, W. and A. Sandroni (2009b). Strategic manipulation of empirical tests. Math-
ematics of Operations Research 34, 57{70.
Sandroni, A. (2003). The reproducible properties of correct forecasts. International Jour-
nal of Game Theory 32, 151{159.
Sandroni, A. and R. Smorodinsky (1999). The speed of rational learning. International
Journal of Game Theory 28, 199{210.
Sandroni, A., R. Smorodinsky, and R. Vohra (2003). Calibration with many checking
rules. Mathematics of Operations Research 28, 141{153.
21Shmaya, E. (2008). Many inspections are manipulable. Theoretical Economics 3, 393{
408.
Sorin, S. (1999). Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information.
Games and Economic Behavior 29, 274{308.
Vovk, V. and G. Shafer (2005). Good randomized sequential probability forecasting is
always possible. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 67, 747{763.
Williams, D. (1991). Probability with Martingales. Cambridge University Press.
22